Politics: The role of the Campaign Hub Weblog. What is the role of a campaign hub weblog in an online campaign? The simple answer is that it should serve as a source of reliable information on the campaign's activities. The more important answer is that it should serve as a way for supporters find each other. In… Continue reading Politics: The role of the Campaign Hub Weblog
Category: News
Fears bin Laden tape 'signal for terror attack'
Fears bin Laden tape 'signal for terror attack'. Terrorism experts believe the latest taped message from Osama bin Laden is the signal for al-Qaeda operatives to launch a major attack against the United States in the next month. [The Scotsman]
What are They Thinking? The Terrorism Watch List(s)
What are They Thinking? The Terrorism Watch List(s). After the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, we learned that the US did not maintain a single terrorism watch list. Instead, multiple agencies maintained multiple lists, which allowed terrorists to slip through the cracks between them. After 9/11, we learned that the US still did not have… Continue reading What are They Thinking? The Terrorism Watch List(s)
Next Gen Terrorism: Virtual operations. Do network-centric cells of terrorists need to plan and coordinate moderate to large operations along traditional lines? Probably not. Here's why.
The traditional approach (at least the way I used to do it in special ops) is to first gather a team of specialists to develop an operations plan. The plan is then built, either over hours or days, with a limited amount of flexibility built in. Time is closely managed. Targets are precisely defined. Unit operations are tightly coupled to ensure economy of force. In execution, the plan is overseen by specialist team managers and senior staff. Decision makers on the ground typically have little flexiblity other than to abort the mission.
In the emerging world of next generation terrorism, enabled by rapid communications and plentiful targets of opportunity, the traditional approach is counterproductive. A loose approach composed of ad hoc communications and individual initiative can provide much greater levels of security and higher probabilities of success.
In this approach cells would develop a range of targets within general guidelines (a section of a city) based on their capabilities (a type of attack). The time schedule would be fluid. The date for an op would be set within a general time frame without specifics. Coordinated action would be done in an ad hoc manner. For example: “once your cell begins operations, my cell will begins too.” “Your cell just hit this target, my cell will hit this complimentary target.” Abort points would be determined based on what each cell sees on the ground or what other cells communicate to each other on the fly (ie. “flash me an SMS message to abort and throw away the phone”). Ops could continue indefinitely using this method until local conditions are too difficult to ensure success.
The benefits of this approach would be as follows:
- Difficult to disrupt. The loss of any one cell would not necessarily imperil the operation since there are few co-dependencies. For example: if a single cell was shut down, other cells could continue operations since no one cell would have another cell's list of targets, an overarching mission plan, or require the other cell's support to continue operations.
- Hard to defend against. The time period of the op could be sufficiently large to make a high level readiness difficult to maintain (could you imagine months of Orange alert?).
- Nearly impossible to detect. Decision cycles would be slow and communications would only be made when security was assured. Target selection would be wide ranging and independently authored.
The real power of a framework like this is in its ability to disrupt systems. More on that later. [John Robb's Weblog
Next Gen Terrorism: Virtual operations. Do network-centric cells of terrorists need to plan and coordinate moderate to large operations along traditional lines? Probably not. Here's why. The traditional approach (at least the way I used to do it in special ops) is to first gather a team of specialists to develop an operations plan. The plan is… Continue reading Next Gen Terrorism: Virtual operations. Do network-centric cells of terrorists need to plan and coordinate moderate to large operations along traditional lines? Probably not. Here's why.
The traditional approach (at least the way I used to do it in special ops) is to first gather a team of specialists to develop an operations plan. The plan is then built, either over hours or days, with a limited amount of flexibility built in. Time is closely managed. Targets are precisely defined. Unit operations are tightly coupled to ensure economy of force. In execution, the plan is overseen by specialist team managers and senior staff. Decision makers on the ground typically have little flexiblity other than to abort the mission.
In the emerging world of next generation terrorism, enabled by rapid communications and plentiful targets of opportunity, the traditional approach is counterproductive. A loose approach composed of ad hoc communications and individual initiative can provide much greater levels of security and higher probabilities of success.
In this approach cells would develop a range of targets within general guidelines (a section of a city) based on their capabilities (a type of attack). The time schedule would be fluid. The date for an op would be set within a general time frame without specifics. Coordinated action would be done in an ad hoc manner. For example: “once your cell begins operations, my cell will begins too.” “Your cell just hit this target, my cell will hit this complimentary target.” Abort points would be determined based on what each cell sees on the ground or what other cells communicate to each other on the fly (ie. “flash me an SMS message to abort and throw away the phone”). Ops could continue indefinitely using this method until local conditions are too difficult to ensure success.
The benefits of this approach would be as follows:
- Difficult to disrupt. The loss of any one cell would not necessarily imperil the operation since there are few co-dependencies. For example: if a single cell was shut down, other cells could continue operations since no one cell would have another cell's list of targets, an overarching mission plan, or require the other cell's support to continue operations.
- Hard to defend against. The time period of the op could be sufficiently large to make a high level readiness difficult to maintain (could you imagine months of Orange alert?).
- Nearly impossible to detect. Decision cycles would be slow and communications would only be made when security was assured. Target selection would be wide ranging and independently authored.
The real power of a framework like this is in its ability to disrupt systems. More on that later. [John Robb's Weblog
Skies of Major U.S. Cities Off Limits for New Year's Eve
Skies of Major U.S. Cities Off Limits for New Year's Eve. The skies of New York, Washington, D.C., Chicago, Las Vegas and Disney World will be patrolled by the military. By Kirk Semple. [New York Times: NYT HomePage]
Many privacy advocates alarmed by rise in online databases
Marin Independent-Journal, CA –Many privacy advocates alarmed by rise in online databases. Edward Socorro had a good thing going as a sales manager with Hilton Hotels Corp. But not long after he started, a company hired by Hilton to do background checks on new employees reported that Socorro once spent six months in jail. In reality, Socorro… Continue reading Many privacy advocates alarmed by rise in online databases
The National Identity Crisis
The National Identity Crisis. Bring up the subject of a national ID card and be prepared for a fight. It doesn't have to be that way: the key is verification, not identification. By Jeffrey Rosen from Wired Magazine. [Wired News]
The Broken Promise of E-Voting
The Broken Promise of E-Voting. Electronic voting machines are supposed to make elections easier and more secure. Unfortunately, the reality of e-voting hasn't caught up with the ideal. By Paul O'Donnell from Wired magazine. [Wired News]
John Robb's Weblog
Question: if a win in Iraq (exemplified by Saddam's capture) was extremely important for American security, why are we in an Orange alert this holiday season? [John Robb's Weblog]
William Lind
William Lind, a military historian, has a 4GW (4th generation warfare) viewpoint on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that is worth reading. Understanding 4GW. How to fight 4GW. How to fight 4GW (part 2) One of his major points: we lost these wars when we destroyed the Afghan and Iraqi states and turned them into a lawless… Continue reading William Lind